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Abstract. This paper analyzes data protection challenges and possible solutions
associated with the usage of the blockchain (BC) technology from the perspective
of 94 German companies and organizations. This paper clusters 537 data
protection-relevant statements into three subject areas: (1) relevance of data
protection in BC, (2) articulated challenges and (3) proposed solutions. Each
group is then collated with insights from computer science. The results show that
a majority of the respondents do see data protection issues with using BC, which
mainly relate to data erasure and identifying the data controller. However, the
majority also consider these problems to be solvable utilizing already available
technologies, e.g. off-chain storage, encryption, pseudonymization or usage of
private BCs. Comparing these proposals with the findings in computer science
literature shows that especially off-chain storage, encryption and redactable
blockchains can be regarded as adequate solutions.
Keywords: Blockchain, Data Protection, Protection of Personal Data, Privacy,
Content Analysis

1

Introduction

Distributed ledger technologies (DLT) use decentralized data storage on the computers
of many users. One variant is the blockchain (BC) technology, which has become one
of the top five strategic decisions for many companies worldwide [1]. Since BC has
gradually been approaching commercialization [2], the discussion concerning an
appropriate regulatory framework has also recently gained momentum worldwide. The
data protection requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) are the
most important regulatory challenge in the European Union (EU). Among the various
data protection (DP) challenges, the following two are the most serious for BC
applications: the difficulty of identifying the data controller, and the DP implications
of the immutability of the data stored in a blockchain [3].
Companies expect disruptive changes and economic gains if BCs are operated in
compliance with data protection [e.g. 4]. Therefore, an intensive debate is ongoing in
academia, industry and regulatory authorities on the compatibility of BC applications
with the data protection framework [5–7]. Although this debate is intensive, it lacks
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empirical evidence of how stakeholders actually assess the DP challenges. Research in
this area generally focuses on two strands. First, there are studies which only ask
companies whether they perceive regulations such as DP as an obstacle. Second, there
is intensive research, particularly from a legal and technical perspective, into solutions
to DP challenges (see Section 2.2).
Several research gaps can be identified here. The analyses of DP challenges usually
remain on an abstract level (in the sense of: is regulation/data protection considered an
obstacle to the use of blockchains in your company?). Quantitative analyses are missing
of the concrete data protection-related challenges that companies face. In addition,
surveys among companies generally do not enquire whether they consider solutions to
the challenges possible.
Thus, our study aims to find out whether and how companies and organizations are
trying to overcome these challenges. Since there is a lack of quantitative analyses of
the possible solutions being discussed, computer science research also lacks analyses
of the usefulness of such proposed solutions. Against this background, we ask the
following research questions:
 RQ1: What challenges and possible solutions do stakeholders see with
regard to data protection and blockchain issues?
 RQ2: How are the proposed solutions to be evaluated from a technical point
of view?
We answer these questions in two steps. To answer RQ1, we rely on a text-based
qualitative content analysis of the statements of 130 actors who participated in the 2019
blockchain consultation of the German government. To answer RQ2, we assess the
challenges articulated and the proposed solutions based on state of the art technical BC
research in computer science literature.
Our study has implications for academia, practitioners and policy makers by
providing qualitative insights into how companies and organizations evaluate the DP
challenges and solutions concerning BC technology.

2

State of Research

2.1

Background of Blockchain Technology

DLT are a type of database with globally decentralized data storage across multiple
computers, so-called nodes [8]. Each node has a partial or full copy of the ledger and
can interchange data formally as a peer-to-peer network without a central authority [9].
Blockchain is a DLT, but consolidates new data into blocks, which are chained to the
preceding one by means of cryptographic hash functions [10]. This results in an appendonly structure, where prior blocks cannot be deleted or edited without changing all the
subsequent blocks. If something tries to change a block, the corresponding hash value
changes, resulting in a breakage of the chain [8]. As every node has a copy of the ledger,
tampering with a single node cannot manipulate the blockchain. This should ensure full
transparency and traceability. This consensus mechanism is, however, only possible for
financial data, as the nodes check whether the total amount, e.g. of Bitcoins, is still

valid after a transaction. This is to ensure that no one can transfer coins they do not
own. In public BCs, nodes are unknown and there is no administrator. In contrast,
permissioned/private or consortium BCs have one or a group of known nodes with
special rights able to grant access to new users (such as nodes, miners or programmers)
and thus control the BC.
The concept emerged during the global financial crisis in 2008, when an author with
the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto introduced the crypto currency Bitcoin to provide
non-manipulable financial transactions on the internet by avoiding intermediaries, e.g.
financial institutions [9, 10]. The term “blockchain” only appeared 2013, but the
underlying technology of storing chained hash values of documents already existed in
1991 [9].
2.2

Data Protection in Blockchain Technologies

The EU considers data protection a fundamental right (see Art. 8 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU) and strives for economic growth (see Recitals 2 and 7
GDPR). Consequently, the GDPR aims to guarantee a high and harmonized level of
data protection for the personal data of EU citizens on the one hand, and to strengthen
the digital single market by removing obstacles that impede the free movement of
personal data on the other (see Recitals 9 and 10 GDPR.). The GDPR represents a
comprehensive and complex set of rules with which these goals are to be achieved. A
wide range of provisions must be complied with in order to ensure that personal data is
processed in accordance with data protection regulations. These include the material
and territorial scope, the definition of personal data, the rules on the lawfulness of
processing, the rights of the data subject, and the obligations of the data controller. The
GDPR has two requirements that stand out in particular for blockchain applications.
First, Art. 4 (7) GDPR is based on the assumption that one or more relatively clearly
identifiable data controllers are responsible for the processing operation, and against
whom the data subject can assert his or her DP rights. However, the technical mode of
operation of public blockchain technology does not provide for clear responsibility.
Instead, it explicitly relies on the decentralization of responsibility. Due to their
influence on determining the means and purposes of BC data processing, nodes and
users can be considered controllers (but not only these depending on the BC). Since
both nodes and users are controllers, the provisions of Art. 26 GDPR on joint controllers
must be fulfilled. In the case of traditional data processing, the joint responsibility of
the data controllers has to be regulated in an agreement. However, as there is
insufficient knowledge of all controllers in public BCs, a contractual sharing of joint
responsibility is not possible [3]. The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) has
finally clarified in its most recent Guidelines (see recital 167) that, in such cases, each
individual controller must comply with the obligations of the GDPR [11]. In a public
blockchain, data is passed on to an unmanageable group of people and the granting of
data subject rights is extremely difficult. Therefore, nodes and users will generally not
be able to meet their obligations [3, 7]. The Schrems II ruling has further complicated
the issue. The ruling clarified that (joint) data controllers must also ensure compliance
with the GDPR in the case of transfers of personal data to countries outside the EU that

do not have an adequate level of data protection [12]. Since, in a public blockchain,
every person from any part of the world can become a node or a user, fulfilling this
requirement is also difficult.
Second, the GDPR grants the data subjects the right to rectify and erase their data.
However, the distinctive feature of BC technology is the immutability of the stored
data, in order to achieve maximum transparency and data integrity [3]. As this brief
discussion has made clear, there are still challenges with regard to the privacycompliant operation of a public BC, which make it necessary to adapt BC architecture
to the legal requirements.
Nonetheless, many companies expect disruptive changes due to BC technology.
Thus, awareness of the challenges posed by DP law has led to an intensive debate. A
number of recent surveys have been carried out to identify the concerns of the business
community. A PricewaterhouseCoopers survey [13] of 600 corporate executives from
15 countries found that 27% considered regulatory uncertainty the biggest barrier to the
use of BCs. A Bitkom survey [14] of 1,004 companies revealed that 66% regarded DP
requirements as a challenge. According to Deloitte's survey [1], 32% of 1,488
companies surveyed named regulatory issues as hindering BC adoption. This study is
the only one that asked companies whether and to what extent they saw possibilities to
overcome the DP challenges. Indeed, 83% of respondents indicated that they were very
or somewhat confident that they would be able to meet the regulatory requirements [1].
Such surveys mainly focus on finding out whether companies see DP as a challenge,
but they do not ask what exactly they regard as challenges or how they will try to
overcome them.
Until a few years ago, IS literature considered DP to be guaranteed, e.g. due to the
anonymity of the nodes [15]. Today, a growing number of papers, mainly in the fields
of computer science [10, 16] and law [3], acknowledge DP challenges, and search for
possible solutions. Some of these deal with the challenges in great depth. To the
authors’ best knowledge, there is no literature on the possible solutions discussed in the
business world and no literature comparing stakeholder views.
The German government published its BC strategy in September 2019 [17]. It laid
down the framework conditions for the further development of the technology and
announced several dozen measures in five fields of action. The subsequent reactions
ranged from clear support [18] to skeptical relief [19] and fundamental criticism [20].
In particular, the lack of uniform goals and a binding timetable was criticized.
With regard to DP issues in connection with BC applications, the German
government stated that it saw no need to amend the GDPR. Instead, the uncertainties
of developers and users with regard to data protection law were to be addressed using
existing technical solutions (including hash values, pseudonymization, ZKP) and
holding a "round table" on the topic of blockchain and data protection [17].

3

Methodology

We conducted a text-based, qualitative content analysis (CA) following [21], because
“it is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts” [21].

Unitizing: As the basis for our analysis, we used the document provided by [22],
containing all the officially published answers given in the consultation process for the
blockchain strategy of the German government. In total, there were 6,261 answers from
130 respondents, which we transferred into a machine-readable format.
Sampling: From this corpus of data, we identified data protection-relevant answers and
questions by applying a keyword search to the statements. Since the blockchain
consultation was conducted in German, we decided to use the terms shown in Table 1
(case insensitive, incl. substrings). These are terms found in the German and English
version of the GDPR as well as synonyms in the relevant data protection literature. In
Table 1, we also provide the percentage of mentions of each keyword within questions
(Q) and given answers (A). We ended up with 537 relevant questions and answers in
total, which we refer to as statements from now on (8.6%).
Table 1: Keywords and percentage of mentions in all statements (Q=question, A=answer)

Keyword

% in Q

% in A

Keyword

% in Q

% in A

Datenschutz

14.90%

35.94%

private Daten

0.00%

0.74%

Privatsphäre

21.23%

5.40%

DS-GVO

0.00%

0.19%

personenbez
ogen

29.24%

18.06%

Privatheit

0.00%

0.13%

DSGVO

3.91%

22.53%

private data

0.00%

0.03%

privacy

0.00%

5.96%

personal data

0.00%

0.00%

GDPR

0.00%

3.72%

Data protection

0.00%

0.00%

persönliche
Daten

0.00%

1.68%

Coding: Two persons coded the statements. Both were familiar with the subject of data
protection; the principal coder (C1) had additional technical expertise in BC
technology. C1 processed all 537 statements and defined the final category set. The
second coder (C2) processed a representative sample of 50 statements from more than
ten percent of the respondents, as suggested by [23].
C1 applied iterative inductive-deductive coding. Based on our research question, we
predefined three subject areas, i.e. “problem relevance”, “articulated challenges” and
“proposed solutions”. In total, 57 codes were identified for each subject area.
Additionally, C1 always noted the usage domain in which the question was situated.
After this initial coding, C2 relied on the codes by C1 and processed the coding of
the representative sample to ensure reproducibility [21]. Our analysis showed a
moderate strength of agreement, manifesting in a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.53 for intercoder
reliability.
Reducing: We applied hybrid card sorting in order to reduce the number of codes and
created clusters based on insights from literature. For example, [16] and [24] considered
pruning, Merkle trees, and chameleon hash functions as erasure methods, as all aim at
(physically) deleting data. This process resulted in a reduction from 57 to 31 categories

(Table 2). Finally, we consulted an expert panel of n=8 to check the codes were
collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive, as suggested by [21].
Table 2. Quantitative representation of codes and categories for each subject area

Group of themes

No. of code categories

No. of codes

Problem description

4

5

Articulated challenges

15

19

Proposed solutions

8

26

General remarks

4

7

Total

31

57

Inferring: In order to “bridge [...] the gap between descriptive accounts of texts and
what they mean, refer to, entail, provoke, or cause” [21], we compared the respondents’
statements with findings from the literature. This yields important insights, as most
respondents are generalists rather than BC experts.
Narrating: We present the procedures and results, theoretical and practical
contributions, and upcoming questions of the content analysis in the next chapters.

4

Results

In this section, we provide a descriptive overview of all DP-related statements of the
respondents. First, we show how relevant DP issues are for the respondents. Second,
we present the specific challenges stated and, finally, we give an overview of the
proposed solutions to these challenges. In total, there were 130 companies and
organizations, of which 94 (72%) provided DP-relevant answers. Their 537 statements
form the basis for this analysis. The respondents are active in different industries, with
a majority in the IT sector (38%), followed by research institutions (18%) and Fintech
(13%). Although our focus is on companies, the analysis involves different types of
stakeholders. Based on our analysis, we cannot identify structural differences in the
answers between the different sectors, as there were not enough data available. The
available data indicate that the automotive, financial and energy sectors are particularly
skeptical about the compatibility of data protection and blockchain. In contrast, the
healthcare and IT sectors are particularly optimistic.1
4.1

Problem Relevance

The first subject area represents how relevant companies and organizations assess DP
in the field of blockchain. The relevance is shown in eight coding categories (Figure 1).

1

Compare the online appendix for a table in which the assessment of how serious the problems
are and whether there are possible solutions was divided by sector.

These results are independent of specific usage domains, but an analysis of the provided
application domains shows similar results.
Out of the total of 94 respondents, a majority (81%) agree that DP is a challenge in
BC applications, whereas only 21 respondents (22%) see no DP challenges, at least in
some usage domains2. 19 respondents (20%) consider DP issues to be so serious that
they expect a showstopper effect for companies. This means that they see no possible
solution to DP issues of BC, either now or in the future. Very few respondents believe
these challenges will discourage companies from adopting blockchain applications. A
majority of 66 respondents are confident that solutions to DP issues are possible. About
one third (29%) of respondents even argue that BC can enhance DP. For example, they
mention "self-sovereign identity" (7%), which helps users to track and configure how
their data must be processed [25].
76

Data protection is a challenge

66

Solutions for these challenges are possible

27

BC can enhance data protection

22
21
19

Case-by-case consideration necessary
Data protection is no challenge
Data protection challenges are a showstopper

13

Only possible with tradeoffs

2

Challenges will discourage companies

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Figure 1. Relevance of data protection issues in blockchain applications in absolute numbers,
n=94 (own analysis, multiple responses possible)

4.2

Articulated Challenges

Guaranteeing the data subject’s rights is seen by 53 respondents as the biggest
challenge. In Figure 2, we refer to these rights with the heading “grouped”. Of these,
50 respondents (94%) consider deletion to be the main problem, 38 (72%) say
rectification and six (11%) see the right of data portability as challenging. 12
respondents (23%) mention guaranteeing these rights in general as problematic. The
second most mentioned challenge by 43 respondents (46%) is that all personal data in
the BC is visible to everyone. The third most frequently mentioned problem was the
(non-)identifiability of the data controller (31 times, 33%). 15 respondents (16%)
criticized the current encryption technologies for personal data, fearing they could be
cracked in the near future. 14 actors (15%) doubted the effectiveness of
pseudonymization and regard de-pseudonymization as a problem. Seven (7%)
criticized the security of storage, which is particularly important in the case of possible
off-chain storage or storage of the keys required for encryption. Four respondents (4%)
2

As the respondents see no challenges in some specific usage domains, the total number of
mentions is 97 (103%), instead of max. 94.

expressed concerns about the integrity or quality of the input data and stated that it is
difficult to verify the correctness of data relating to objects in the physical world.
Finally, three respondents (3%) criticized the high computing power requirements of
zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) and the effectiveness of anonymizing personal data.
In addition, seven respondents (7%) drew attention to the legal problems arising
from the transfer and data storage outside the EU. In the same context, seven
respondents (7%) criticized the unclear legal situation, both with regard to divergent
legal frameworks worldwide, which made the use of a global BC more difficult, and
with regard to the - from their perspective - unclear legal situation in the EU.

Figure 2. Overview of articulated challenges (multiple coding possible)

4.3

Proposed Solutions

A majority of the respondents believe that solutions to DP issues in blockchain
technology are generally possible. In the following section, we briefly present the
proposed solutions that were mentioned by the respondents.
Figure 3 shows that the majority of respondents (62 or 66%) believed that a solution
to the DP challenges was already possible using existing technology. This included offchain storage in the first place (43 or 46%), closely followed by encryption technologies
(37 and 39%). 18 actors (19%) considered pseudonymization to be a useful approach.
The use of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) represented a possible solution for 13 actors
(14%). Twelve actors (13%) thought that there are possibilities for deleting data. The
use of existing anonymization methods was mentioned by eleven actors (12%).
The second most frequently mentioned proposal (38 actors/40%) was to simply
refrain from storing personal data in a BC. 31 stakeholders (33%) were in favor of

restricting access by using a private BC. 29 actors (31%) mentioned legal adjustments.
Of those, 27 (29%) mention the concretization and amendment of the GDPR, four (4%)
the creation of legal bases that apply worldwide (4 or 14%), and two (2%) cooperation
with other countries.
29 respondents (31%) expressed the opinion that further technical developments and
standards were necessary to operate BCs in conformity with data protection laws. With
the help of organizational security measures, such as user roles or data aggregation, a
solution to DP problems could be found, according to 17 actors (18%). This included
user roles and rights (9 or 10%), assigning different protection levels to different types
of data (8 or 9%), and the exclusive storage of data aggregates (3 or 3%).

Figure 3. Overview of proposed solutions (multiple coding possible)

5

Discussion

In this section, we compare the articulated challenges and proposed solutions with the
state of research. The results show that the majority of respondents (81%) consider data
protection a challenge in BC. However, many of the respondents in the BC consultation
consider the challenges to be manageable. Our results also show that many respondents
promote BC technology, whereas others are rather critical or cannot make a generally
valid statement. Further, our results suggest that many companies and organizations are
not very familiar with “the BC issue” or have no desire to delve deeper into it. This can
be seen, for example, in the fact that almost a third of the respondents urged to
concretize or amend the GDPR and called on public authorities to offer guidelines.
Whereas publishing guidelines is certainly a realistic option for action (as the recent

EDPB guidelines on accountability have shown), amendments of the GDPR are most
unlikely at this point in time [26]. In the following subsections, we discuss the
statements articulated by the respondents.
5.1

General Statements

Several respondents raise questions concerning information security goals, i.e.
confidentiality, integrity and availability, which we want to discuss briefly. While
immutability and distributed storage fulfill integrity and availability requirements; the
blockchain “is not specifically designed to support or maintain data confidentiality”
[27]. Although the company Achelos suggests using encryption to tackle these
problems, encryption cannot prevent internal errors, such as misuse.
Additionally, a few respondents note that the inserted data is not verified. Thus, data
quality control is an issue. The literature agrees on that point, as the BC technology
“does not guarantee or improve data quality” [28]. Neither the respondents nor the
literature suggest possible solutions.
Almost one third of the respondents articulate the need for technical developments
and standards to operate BCs in a DP-compliant manner. According to the company
DB Systel, there are currently only "trade-offs between security, data protection,
efficiency, flexibility, platform complexity and user-friendliness for developers" (own
translation). The literature acknowledges that the prerequisites for successful research
have been created and it is likely that a large number of new applications will emerge
in the near future [29].
Finally, for about one fifth of the respondents, technical solutions do not seem to be
sufficient at this point of time. Instead, they suggest three types of organizational
measures: (1) introduction of user roles and rights, (2) allocation of different protection
levels to different types of data, e.g. medical data, and (3) exclusive storage of data
aggregates. The literature also discusses such measures for BC applications, e.g. [30]
find that "organizational measures need to be taken to fulfill the boundary conditions,
before blockchain can be used successfully". Generally, private BCs can comply with
these three types of measures, as a central authority can be defined. For (1), a predefined
data controller could allow new users and assign rights and roles, which could be
themselves stored in the BC using smart contracts [7]. For (2), it is technically possible
to assign data categories that define conditions of use and specify a group of privileged
recipients [3]. [31] describe a method for service providers to carry out data processing
directly in the user's network without accessing raw data. This can ensure that users can
only access certain data. At present, there does not seem to be a sufficient solution for
the (3) measure. Researchers agree that performing privacy-preserving data aggregation
is challenging due to advancements in data processing using big data and artificial
intelligence [32].
5.2

Rights of the Data Subject: Erasure, Rectification and Data Portability

Problem description: By far the most frequently mentioned problem relates to
guaranteeing the rights of data subjects to the erasure or rectification of their data. This

is hardly possible, because of the immutable nature of BCs. Several researchers agree
that these are the most pressing points when considering DP in BC applications [24].
Another problem mentioned by the respondents is data portability. This calls for data
being stored in structured, commonly used and machine-readable formats. However,
there is no standard exchange format in the blockchain [33].
Suggested solutions and evaluation: Most respondents suggest off-chain storage. In
this case, only a reference hash value of the original file will be stored in the BC. As
hash values are collision-free, changes to the original file can be detected and thus
transparency achieved, while being able to continue the blockchain [34]. Contrary to
the original BC idea, the operator must be trusted, since there are ways to change stored
data afterwards. Such methods are often referred to as redactable blockchains [24]. One
prominent example mentioned by the respondents are chameleon hash functions, which
have collision-free algorithms that enable a group of controllers to delete data while
leaving a “scar” [35]. However, deletion is only possible in permissioned BC
architectures, because data controllers need to coincide and deletion is an exception
[24]. Another drawback is the possible identification of a hash value in a small search
space [36]. For example, a modern graphic card can calculate the double-sha256 hashes
of all human names (7.6 bn) in under 4 seconds [37]. Thus, there is the need to add
random data, a so-called “secret”. To identify users as data holders, this secret must be
transmitted. However, attacks could compromise the transition and intercept the secret.
To overcome this problem, some respondents suggest Merkle trees, which are used,
e.g. in the Bitcoin blockchain, to reclaim disk space [9]. These combine hashes of
different data fields, such as the hash of the name and the hash of the birthdate and
create a new hash. This results in a tree-like structure. Only the uppermost hash
(analogous to the tree trunk) is saved in the BC [38], so that no single person can
identify the original hash. Especially in the Bitcoin BC, Merkle trees are used to verify
data blocks to ensure that no miner transmits a manipulated financial transaction.
Zero knowledge proofs (ZKP) represent another solution, which dispenses with the
release of the "secret". They do not use a person's real data, but rather a proof that the
datum exists or is correct [39]. In such a way, one could easily check whether a person
is older than 18, without revealing the actual birthdate. However, there are two
disadvantages. First, the literature suggests that an attacker could try out all possible
input values until the proof is verified [40]. Second, the respondents note that ZKP
require considerable computing power. Whereas the transactions are stored on-chain,
the computation and storage are performed off-chain.
Other respondents mentioned tombstones and data revocation keys as deletion
methods. However, both these methods only mark data as invalid and do not physically
delete it, as required by Art. 17 GDPR. Here, at first glance, forking seems a solution.
It presents an irreversible separation from a BC. However, if data changes and deletions
have to occur frequently, the chain needs to be split very often. This contradicts the
basic BC idea, since short chains may counteract transparency [41]. The so-called
pruning is a deletion method already used in the Bitcoin blockchain. Pruning removes
old and thus no longer needed parts of the chain while maintaining the integrity of the
whole chain using Merkle trees [9]. However, this can only delete transaction values
that have been “consumed” (i.e. spent Bitcoin). No other data could be pruned [6].

Concerning the right of data portability, it is unlikely that a standard file format will
evolve in the near future, as lock-in effects are economically advantageous to
companies. The current diversity of the blockchain market underlines this problem [2].
The question also arises as to who should guarantee the rights of those affected (see the
following subsection).
5.3

Identification of the Data Controller

Problem description: To protect the rights of a data subject, the GDPR provides for a
(joint) data controller who, for example, acts as an addressee for data subjects to assert
their rights, or who fulfills the transparency requirements of the Articles 13 and 14. One
third of all respondents were of the opinion that the difficulty in identifying the data
controller (see also section 2.2) makes it considerably harder to comply with the legal
requirements.
Suggested solutions and evaluation: Respondents suggest using a permissioned
private or consortium blockchain, as the participants are known there. Researchers,
such as [3], agree with this, even though this contradicts the basic BC idea of
transparency and distributed responsibility. Nevertheless, in light of recent
developments in case law and EDPB recommendations, we concur with this
assessment. In view of the vast number and geographical location of different nodes
and users, we do not expect that it will be possible to fulfill the data protection
requirements regarding the obligations of data controllers in a public BC. Alternatively,
the problem of responsibility could be solved by limiting the personal nature of data to
a manageable group of actors (see the following subsection on encryption) [3, 7].
5.4

Encryption

Problem description: In connection with the above-mentioned problems of identifying
the data controller and guaranteeing the rights of those affected by data processing, an
important strand of the debate is devoted to solutions using encryption.
Suggested solutions and evaluation: Many respondents point out that the DP
challenges related to erasure could be solved by encryption. The respondents’
assumptions sound simple: data would only be considered personal for those actors who
have the access key. In this regard, eco - the Association of the Internet Industry
demands that the verified destruction of a decryption key should be considered
sufficient for anonymization.
The French Data Protection Authority CNIL agrees with this opinion. However, [3]
points out the need for further regulatory advice on this issue, as under the current
conditions, even nodes that do not actually have significant control over the encrypted
data could still be considered responsible.
From a technical point of view, encryption is not identical to physical erasure - it
only makes data inaccessible. In this respect, both respondents and researchers fear that
current encryption methods could be cracked in the future and data made accessible [7].
However, (a)synchronous encryption algorithms such as AES or RSA are commonly
used to encrypt bulk data [42] and cracking these is very unlikely in practice, as AES-

256 and RSA-2048 are considered secure for the next decades [43]. However, BC
creates an immutable technology architecture, which relies on cryptographic
procedures. In case of an error in a procedure, the entire chain would be affected
forever. Thus, as long as no further regulatory guidance is provided, only erasure
methods as discussed in Section 5.2 could help to overcome the problems.
5.5

Storage outside the European Union

Problem description: The GDPR requires that if any personal data is transferred
outside the EU, it must meet the requirements of Articles 44-49 GDPR. As a public BC
is distributed among many (unidentifiable) users, personal data could be stored outside
of the EU, which causes compliance difficulty.
Suggested solutions and evaluation: The respondents referred to the use of a private
or consortium blockchain. Indeed, this would solve some challenges, as only EU
citizens could be allowed to join. However, it would thwart the BC's goal of maximizing
transparency. While relying on a public chain, geo-blocking could be a solution, but is
not in accordance with European law [44]. Furthermore, VPN software can easily
circumvent geo-blocking.3 Apart from the possibilities mentioned above, the transfer
of data outside the EU is currently an ongoing problem (not only) in the BC context.
5.6

Data Readability and Writability for BC Participants

Problem description: Another important challenge articulated by the respondents is
that all blockchain users can read and write all data, even personal data, as there is no
possibility of verification for non-transactional data. Here a dilemma arises: while the
visibility of all data ought to support transparency, readability and writability also raises
significant DP concerns, because any user can add personal data to the BC. This poses
a challenge even if limiting responsibility to the owner of the private keys would enable
DP-compliant operation of a BC. Indeed, other users could enter unencrypted personal
data into BC at any time and thus invalidate its data protection compliance.
Suggested solutions and evaluation: Most respondents suggest using accessrestricted (private) blockchains to let only registered users participate. Although this
could relieve several DP challenges, it runs counter to the BC intention of ensuring full
transparency. Other respondents suggest a rather pragmatic approach: simply no
storage of personal data. However, technical or organizational measures cannot fully
achieve this. Firstly, data that are not personal today, could become so in future [45].
Secondly, content filters could be easily circumvented by experienced users, and
excluding these users is also very difficult [46]. Respondents also discuss
pseudonymization as an effective method to veil personal references. However, it has
become relatively easy to re-assign data. For example, [47] de-pseudonymized up to
60% of the IP addresses used to execute Bitcoin transactions. The literature does not
provide effective solutions to render de-pseudonymization impossible, as even TOR
3

Please note that this assessment was made before July 16, 2020, when the European
Court of Justice ruled that the EU-US Privacy Shield is invalid.

network users can be identified by their Bitcoin transactions [48]. Another possible
solution is a Bitcoin mixer, which combines several transactions into a large bitcoin
pool and then distributes the coins to the receivers [49]. However, the service provider
still knows the user’s bitcoin address and could de-anonymize data. Furthermore, the
mixing service could be a honeypot set up by governments to identify users. For the
same reason, anonymization cannot be guaranteed for all BC applications. Even
Monero, which claims to be an anonymous cryptocurrency, is prone to deanonymization errors [50].

6

Conclusions and Outlook

The data protection-related challenges of BC technology are taking center stage for
many companies in different industry sectors. Despite a broad debate, little was known
about the concrete challenges facing companies and how they intend to overcome them.
Our results augment the existing literature in several regards. First, our study
contributes to undermining the view that DP regulations are an insurmountable hurdle
to the use of BCs. The number of actors perceiving a challenge (81%) and believing it
can be overcome (70%) is very similar. Second, our analysis provides insights into
which challenges the stakeholders regard as particularly important. Immutability is the
biggest challenge for most respondents. Whereas many answers relate to public BCs
and guaranteeing data subjects’ rights, some respondents even promote BC as
improving DP, e.g. via self-sovereign identities. Third, our results also show that the
majority consider the problems solvable with already available technologies, in
particular off-chain storage, encryption, pseudonymization and ZKPs. However, a
comparison with state-of-the-art scientific literature reveals that only off-chain storage
and encryption are advisable. Finally, a considerable number of actors also demanded
the use of a private BC, promotion of further technical developments, and
concretization or modification of the GDPR. These results show that stakeholders are
aware that there is no silver bullet to overcome DP-related challenges. Instead, solutions
depend strongly on the specific implementation and use case. Ultimately, our results
show that most challenges arise in the field of public BCs. Thus, academia should focus
on solutions here (e.g. chameleon hash functions). Furthermore, computer science
research could benefit from empirical insights into how BC stakeholders perceive the
challenges and solutions, and how these coincide with research. Practitioners can
benefit from the evaluation of solutions to installing a BC architecture that best
addresses DP demands. Additionally, our results offer important insights for policy
makers, as they can see what specific challenges companies face and which research to
support.
Although we rely on a large sample of 94 stakeholders, it is not representative for all
industry sectors, since the sample contains only actors who took part in the consultation.
The quantity and quality of coders is another common criticism of content analysis.
However, our reliability measure shows moderate strength.
Future research could make a quantitative analysis of how often the proposed
solutions are mentioned by stakeholders across all industry sectors. This would also

pave the way for sector-specific analyses to find out whether, for example, certain
sectors see greater challenges, or whether economic actors and researchers hold
different views.
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